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GOD, COMMITMENT, AND OTHER FAITHS: 
PLURALISM VS. RELATIVISM 
Joseph Runzo 
This paper addresses the challenge of the problem of religious pluralism: how can we re-
main fully committed to our most basic truth-claims about God, and yet take full account of 
the claims of other world religious traditions? Six possible responses to this problem are 
delineated and assessed. Among the possible responses, certain strengths are identified in 
Inclusivism, though it is rejected. Focusing then on Religious Pluralism and Religious 
Relativism, these two views are extensively compared and contrasted. Finally, Christian 
Relativism is defended on the grounds that it best incorporates the strengths, without the 
salient weaknesses, of other possible responses to the conflicting truth-claims of the world 
religions. 
Crises in religion historically precipitate revolutions in religious thought. Today, 
the impressive piety and evident rationality of the belief systems of other religious 
traditions, inescapably confronts Christians with a crisis-and a potential revo-
lution. How should Christians respond responsibly to the conflicting claims of 
other faiths? More pointedly, should Christians abjure traditional claims to the one 
truth and the one way to salvation? As even Descartes (rather quaintly) observes 
in his Discourse on Method, 
. . . I further recognised in the course of my travels that all those whose 
sentiments are very contrary to ours are yet not necessarily barbarians or 
savages, but may be possessed of reason in as great or even a greater de-
gree than ourselves. I also considered how very different the self-same 
man, identical in mind and spirit, may become, according as he is brought 
up from childhood amongst the French or Germans, or has passed his 
whole life amongst Chinese or cannibals. 1 
Religious beliefs, like many philosophical orientations, seem largely an accident 
of birth. If you are born in India, you are likely to be a Hindu; ifbom in France, you 
are likely to be a Christian. Moreover, on their own grounds, Buddhists and Mus-
lims and adherents of other great religious faiths, seem rationally justified in their 
beliefs. This raises the problem of religious pluralism: the mutually conflicting 
systems of truth-claims of the world's religions, iftaken separately, appear ration-
ally justified-but are they correct? Is only one system of religious truth-claims 
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correct, is more than one system correct, or are all religious systems mistaken? 
Descartes, concluding from the diversity of opinion which he observed that "it is 
much more custom and example that persuade us than any certain knowledge," 
attempts to arrive at a method for attaining certainty, despite the fact that "there is 
nothing imaginable so strange or so little credible that it has not been maintained 
by one philosopher or other. "2 Likewise, is there one correct religious system, and 
can we know what it is? Or is the search for universal or certain truth in religious 
matters as overambitious as Descartes was philosophically overly ambitious? 
A major problem with the desire for a comforting certainty in religious matters is 
identified in Tillich' s observation that the church has become all too insular: "theo-
logians have become careless in safeguarding their idea of a personal God from 
slipping into 'henotheistic' mythology (the belief in one god who, however, re-
mains particular and bound to a particular group). "3 But if henotheism poses a dan-
ger on one side, a too ready acceptance of pluralism in religion poses a danger on 
the other side. For an uncritical pluralism undermines the strength of commitment 
of faith. How then can we both remain fully committed to our most basic truth-
claims about God, and at the same time take full account of religious pluralism? 
Christians today must be responsive to other faiths, but responsive within the 
Christian vision expressed in the Vatican II Declaration Nostra Aetate: " ... all 
peoples comprise a single community, and have a single origin ... God ... One 
also is their final goal: God. "4 
After explaining why the problem of religious pluralism is a problem of con-
flicting truth-claims, I will set out six possible responses, religious and non-
religious, to the conflicting truth-claims of the world's religions. Then I will assess 
each response in tum from an external, religious (but not necessarily Christian) 
point of view, ultimately focusing on the Pluralist and Relativist responses. I will 
end by defending the Relativist response from an internal, Christian perspective, 
and explain how it incorporates strengths, without some of the salient weaknesses, 
of other possible responses to the conflicting truth-claims of the world religions. 
I 
In the Dynamics of Faith, TiIIich suggests that "The conflict between religions 
is not a conflict between forms of belief, but it is a conflict between expressions 
of our ultimate concern .... All decisions offaith are existential, not theoretical, 
decisions. "5 It would be a gross distortion of faith to reduce it to merely theoretical 
concerns or to questions of belief. But in avoiding this intellectualist distortion 
of faith TiIIich is mistaken to suggest that the conflict between religions is not 
a conflict between truth-claims. True, a religious way oflife importantly involves 
such elements as ritual and symbols, and a moral ordering of one's life. But our 
beliefs, or more comprehensively, our world-views-i.e., the total cognitive 
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web of our interrelated concepts, beliefs, and processes of rational thought-
determine the very nature of our ultimate concern. For all experience, understand-
ing, and praxis-whether it concerns the mundane or the mysterium tremendum-
is structured by our world-views. Consequently, conflicts between religious 
traditions fundamentally stem from conflicts of belief, conflicts over specific 
claims about how meaning and value are to be achieved, and what is the desired 
telos for humankind. 
In assessing the conflict of truth-claims among world religions it must be kept 
in mind that a religion is not itself true or false any more than any other human 
institution such as art, government, or law, is in and of itself true or false. A 
total institution-aesthetic, political, legal, or religious-is only more or less 
expedient, only more or less effective in meeting its intended goals. What is 
true or false, and what is most fundamentally in conflict between such systems, 
are the underlying, specific truth-claims within the systems. Now, in the conflict 
of religious truth-claims, all of the world's major religions agree that the divine, 
or the Absolute, or the Real, is One, transcends the natural order, and is ulti-
mately inexpressible. As Ecclesiastes puts it, God "has put eternity into man's 
mind, yet so that he cannot find out what God has done from the beginning 
to the end." (Eccles. 3: 11, RSV) But though they have this general point of 
agreement, and though each religious tradition includes truth-claims and even 
scriptural material which is expendable, there is a fundamental or "vital core" 
of beliefs in each religion which is definitive of that very tradition. 6 And it is 
particular elements of this "vital core" of beliefs that are incompatible among 
world religions. 
For instance, there is no intractable conflict between claims in the Muslim 
tradition that Mahdis will periodically appear to revive faith in God, and orthodox 
Christian claims that Jesus represents the final prophetic revelation of God. For 
Christians could come to accept, and Sunnis could come to reject, further 
prophetic revelations from God via Mahdis, without impugning the respective 
orthodox status of Jesus or Mohammed. 7 But traditionally it is essential to 
monotheistic traditions, like Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Ramanujan Hin-
duism, that the correct human perception of the divine is the perception of a 
personal deity. In contrast, on a Hinayana (Theravada) Buddhist view, God does 
not exist, and in much of the Hindu tradition, the notion of a personal deity is 
talk about an illusory state of affairs bound to this life. Or, to take another 
trenchant conflict among religious truth-claims, consider some of the diverse 
notions of the relation of humanity to Ultimate Reality. In Hinayana Buddhism 
there is no real question of one's relation to ultimate reality, for the goal of 
liberation is the complete extinction of the ego; in Islam the basic human relation 
to God is one of slave to master; in orthodox Judaism the central relation is one 
of a servant to his or her God. 
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Thus, because they make essentially different truth-claims, different religious 
traditions are structured by essentially different world-views, offering essentially 
different paths to what is perceived as Ultimate Reality. Since a person's world-
view, then, is inherently constitutive of their religious way of life, the question 
is whether the differences in truth-claims among the world religions, and the 
consequent differences in the (putative) paths to Ultimate Reality, are significant 
or ultimately irrelevant. 
We can also see that the conflict among the world religions is fundamentally 
a conflict of truth-claims if we consider the meaning of "faith" and of "religion." 
Faith is the more encompassing notion. Faith can be either religious or non-reli-
gious: we speak of faith in the progress of science or in the inevitableness of 
dialectical materialism, as much as of Christian or Muslim faith. Therefore, 1 
will use the term "faith" to refer to a person's fundamental commitment to any 
world-view, a commitment which is a total dispositional state of the person 
involving affective, conative, and cognitive elements. 
Religion, on the other hand, involves a particular form of faith, focused within 
a specific religious tradition. To distinguish religious from non-religious faith, 
I will define a religion or religious tradition as a set of symbols and rituals, 
myths and stories, concepts and truth-claims, which a community believes gives 
ultimate meaning to life, via its connection to a transcendent God or Ultimate 
Reality beyond the natural order. Thus religion is a human construct (or institution) 
which fundamentally involves beliefs at two levels: (I) it involves the meta-belief 
that the religion in question does indeed refer to a transcendent reality which 
gives meaning to life, and (II) it involves specific beliefs-including vital core 
beliefs-about the nature of that ultimate reality and the way in which it gives 
meaning to life. The first sort of belief, (I), is shared by the world religions. 
The second sort of belief, (II), is the point of conflict among the world religions. 
II 
There are six possible responses, religious and non-religious, to the conflicting 
truth-claims of vital core beliefs among the world religions: 8 
1. Atheism: all religions are mistaken. 
2. Religious Exclusivism: only one world religion is correct, and all 
others are mistaken. 
3. Religious Inclusivism: only one world religion is fully correct, but 
other world religions participate in or partially reveal some of the 
truth of the one correct religion. 
4. Religious Subjectivism: each world religion is correct, and each is 
correct insofar as it is best for the individual who adheres to it. 
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5. Religious Pluralism: ultimately all world religions are correct, each 
offering a different, salvific path and partial perspective vis-a-vis the 
one Ultimate Reality. 
6. Religious Relativism: at least one, and probably more than one, world 
religion is correct, and the correctness of a religion is relative to the 
world-view(s) of its community of adherents. 
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One obvious response to the conflicting truth-claims of the world's religions 
is the Atheist response, (1). Is it not most plausible, given the enormity of the 
conflict among truth-claims, that all religious traditions are simply false in dif-
ferent ways, rather than that one is correct, or that several are correct in different 
ways? In the absence of a generally acceptable deductive proof or inductive 
proof with a high probability, for the existence of God or the Absolute, there is 
no incontrovertible reply to this query. Indeed, there are important sociological 
and psychological arguments, like those of Feuerbach and Freud, which lend 
support to the Atheist response. 
At stake here is the basic religious presupposition that only reference to a 
transcendent divine or ultimate reality gives ultimate meaning to human life. 
This meta-belief (I) is supported in the various religious traditions by appeals to 
religious experience, purported transformations of people's lives, the claimed 
necessity of a "leap of faith," and so on. These are internal considerations which 
will not, of course, prove that the Atheist response (1) must be mistaken. But 
in this discussion we can set aside the Atheist response if we take the basic 
religious meta-belief (I) as a presupposition. 
Turning to the second response, Exclusivism in its strongest form is exemplified 
by the traditional Roman Catholic dogma, Extra ecclesiam nulla salus. 
Exclusivism is the view that salvation can only be found either (as in the dogma 
just cited) inside a particular institutional structure, or on the basis of a specified 
tradition of religious beliefs, symbols, and rituals~.g., as Karl Barth says of 
Christianity, "the Christian religion is true, because it has pleased God, who 
alone can be the judge in this matter, to affirm it to be the true religion."9 But 
such unqualified Exclusivism seems untenable in the face of the problem of 
religious pluralism. In Ernst Troeltsch's words, regarding Christianity, 
a study of the non-Christian religions convinced me more and more that 
their naive claims to absolute validity are also genuinely such. I found 
Buddhism and Brahminism especially to be really humane and spiritual 
religions, capable of appealing in precisely the same way to the inner 
certitude and devotion of their followers as Christianity, . . . IO 
Principal considerations against Exclusivism within any religious tradition 
include the following: Historically, it is largely a matter of geographical accident 
348 Faith and Philosophy 
whether one grows up as a Hindu or Buddhist, Christian or Muslim, etc. Theo-
logically, a strict reading of Exclusivism condemns the vast majority of humanity 
to perdition, which certainly appears contrary to the notion of a loving God, as well 
as seeming to contradict the idea of an Absolute which is the telos of all humankind. 
Ethically, Religious Exclusivism has the morally repugnant result of making those 
who have privileged knowledge, or who are intellectually astute, a religious elite, 
while penalizing those who happen to have no access to the putatively correct 
religious views, or who are incapable of advanced understanding. Sociologically, 
Exc1usivism is a concomitant of sectarianism, serving as a rationale for enforcing 
discipline and communal cohesion. II Epistemologically, one could not know with 
certainty that there is only one correct set of religious truth-claims or only one in-
stitutional structure providing a path to salvation-a consideration exacerbated by 
the fact that all religions at some point make Exc1usivist claims. And religiously, 
Exc1usivism is highly presumptuous, ignoring the fact that religious truth-claims 
are human constructs, human attempts to know Ultimate Reality, subject to the 
limitations and fallibility of the human mind. 
It is of course possible that the Exclusivism of some particularreligious tradition 
is correct. But given these weighty considerations against Exclusivism, we must 
tum to responses (3) - (6), responses that hold that in some form each of the great 
world religions is at least in part correctly directed toward the divine or Absolute. 
The problem is how to avoid the serious moral, theological, empirical, and epis-
temological deficiencies of Exc1usivism without dissipating the very cohesiveness 
and vitality of one's own religious tradition which Exclusivism properly seeks 
to protect. 
III 
A natural alternative to take to meet these concerns is Inclusivism. This has 
become an especially prominent view in Roman Catholic theology since Vatican 
II. Religious Inclusivists jointly hold two theses: That other religions convey 
part of the truth about Ultimate Reality and the relation of humanity to Ultimate 
Reality, but that only one's own tradition most fully provides an understanding 
of Ultimate Reality, and most adequately provides a path to salvation. Thus, 
Nostra Aetate states both that "The Catholic Church rejects nothing which is 
true and holy in [other] religions," and that the cross of Christ "is the sign of 
God's all-embracing love" and "the fountain from which every grace flOWS."12 
From these foundations, Christian Inclusivism has been developed in consid-
erable detail by Karl Rahner, who suggests that those in the non-Christian tradi-
tions can be "anonymous" Christians. Since, Rahner suggests, "we have to keep 
in mind ... the necessity of Christian faith and the universal salvific will of 
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God's love and omnipotence," 
we can only reconcile them by saying that somehow all men must be 
capable of being members of the Church; and this capacity must not be 
understood merely in the sense of an abstract and purely logical possi-
bility, but as a real and historically concrete one. 13 
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In the same vein, R. C. Zaehner offers an historical argument for Inclusivism: 
The drive towards the integration of ... the personal and the collective, 
has been characteristic of the most original thinkers in [all religions] 
during the first two-thirds of the twentieth century .... This unity in 
diversity is the birthright of the Catholic Church . . . all the other reli-
gions, in their historical development, grow into 'other Catholic 
Churches' ... [For while one God] is the inspiration of all religions 
and peculiar to none . . . The only religion that has from the beginning 
been both communal and individual is Christianity. 14 
Inclusivism is typically based on the notion that one's own religion most fully 
possesses a particular element which is most essential to religion. Zaehner looks 
to the integration of the personal and collective; Kant holds that true religiosity 
is identical to the moral life; Schleiermacher proposes that underlying genuine 
religion is "the feeling of absolute dependence"; Rudolph Otto emphasizes a 
numinous sense of the holy, a sense of the mysterium tremendum; Nostra Aetate 
declares that "from ancient times down to the present, there has existed among 
diverse peoples a certain perception of that hidden power which hovers over the 
course of things and over the events of human life"; and John Baillie suggests 
that all humans have a knowledge of God through a felt presence of the divine 
such that all people "already believe in him. "15 
That other religious traditions, in accordance with the religious meta-belief 
(I), might provide some apprehension of Ultimate Reality, is not at issue here. 
Rather, Inclusivism supposes that a particular sort of apprehension and under-
standing of Ultimate Reality is elemental to all religion. However, in the first 
place we could not know that all humans have the same sort of elemental apprehen-
sion of Ultimate Reality. Second, the empirical evidence supports precisely the 
opposite supposition. Even in the broadest terms, the notion of an elemental 
apprehension of Ultimate Reality is understood in personal terms in the 
monotheistic traditions, while it is non-personal in Confucianism and in Hindu 
and Buddhist traditions. And third, each religion tends to see itself as the culmi-
nation of the elemental apprehension of Ultimate Reality: "other religions can 
have their own fulfillment theology. Sri Aurobindo sees the world religious 
process converging on Mother India rather than the Cosmic Christ, and Sir 
Muhammad Iqbal sees it converging upon a kind of ideal Islam."16 
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So when Rahner, for example, says that the Christian has, "other things being 
equal, a still greater chance of salvation than someone who is merely an 
anonymous Christian,"17 this can only be a statement of faith, not one of certain 
knowledge. Yet the strength ofInclusivism is this unequivocal faith-within an 
acceptance of other traditions-that one's own religion is salvific. Inclusivism 
expresses an appropriate religious disposition. But Inclusivism ultimately fails 
as a warranted epistemological thesis. This failure leads us to the pluralistic 
types of responses to the problem of religious pluralism. 
IV 
Subjectivism, Pluralism, and Relativism are all pluralistic responses to the 
conflicting truth-claims of world religions. All three views share a basic idealist 
epistemology: i.e., they share the basic assumption that the world we experience 
and understand is not the world independent of our perceiving but a world at 
least in part structured by our minds. Thus these pluralistic views share the 
epistemic view expressed in the Kantian dictum that "[sensible] intuitions without 
concepts are blind,"l" a view sometimes expressed in the contemporary notion 
that all experiencing is experiencing-as. But further, they share the assumption 
that there is more than one set of human concepts-more than one world-view-
which is valid for understanding the world. Thus they share the sort of pluralist 
epistemology expressed by William James in The Varieties of Religious Experi-
ence: "why in the name of common sense need we assume that only 
one ... system of ideas can be true? The obvious outcome of our total experience 
is that the world can be handled according to many systems of ideas, ... "19 
The three pluralistic religious responses all hold that one's perception of religious 
truth is in some sense relative to one's world-view. Typically this view is sup-
ported on the grounds of the ineluctable enculturation or the historicity of all 
thought and experience, or, as in the Whorfhypothesis, by suggesting a necessary 
connection between language, which varies from community to community, and 
truth, which consequently varies. 
The most radical of the pluralistic responses to the conflicting truth-claims of the 
world religions is Subjectivism, where religious truth and salvation are literally as 
varied as individuals are diverse. As a general view in epistemology, subjectivism 
is a form of relativism about truth. It is the extreme epistemological position that 
truth is relative to each individual's idiosyncratic world-view. Thus, on a Religious 
Subjectivist's view, religion is a radically private affair, often understood as purely 
a matter of one's individual relation to the divine or Absolute. But subjectivism, 
and therefore Religious Subjectivism, is conceptually incoherent. Truth-bearers are 
statements or propositions. Statements or propositions are comprised of concepts. 
And precisely what Wittgenstein's "private-language" argument demonstrates is 
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that concepts are social constructions and cannot be purely private, individual 
understandings. 20 Thus, since statements and propositions are comprised of con-
cepts, and concepts are social constructs, truth cannot be idiosyncratically individ-
ualistic. Religious Subjectivism, then, must be rejected. 
The two remaining pluralistic views, Religious Pluralism and Religious 
Relativism, are often conflated. John Hick offers a concise description of 
Pluralism as the view that "There is not merely one way but a plurality of ways 
of salvation or liberation ... taking place in different ways within the contexts 
of all the great religious traditions."2' Pluralism holds that there is only one 
Ultimate Reality, but that Ultimate Reality is properly, though only partially, 
understood in different ways. Following a metaphor which Hick employs, just 
as the historian does not have direct access to figures of history, and consequently 
different historians develop different perspectives on historical figures like Gen-
ghis Khan or Sun Yat-Sen because of historians' different methods of inquiry, 
cultural backgrounds, etc., so too, different religious traditions or different 
theologies, not having direct access to the divine, offer different enculturated 
"images" of the one Ultimate Reality. 22 On the Pluralist account, there is no 
ultimate conflict between these different perspectives, since there still remains 
one set of truths, even if those truths are imperfectly and only partially understood 
within each perspective. Religious Pluralism, then, focuses on the viability of 
different religious perspectives on Ultimate Reality. 
Religious Relativism, in contrast, is directly a thesis about differences of 
religious truth-claims. The Religious Relativist minimally holds the general epis-
temic view, which I shall designate as "conceptual relativism," that first-order 
truth-claims about reality--e.g., that persons or that subatomic particles or that 
God exists-are relative to the world-view of a particular society. 23 More pre-
cisely, a conceptual relativist definitively holds that, corresponding to differences 
of world-view, there are mutually incompatible, yet individually adequate, sets 
of conceptual-schema-relative truths.24 Thus for the Religious Relativist, unlike 
the Pluralist, truth itself is relative and plural. 
However, Religious Pluralism and Religious Relativism do share two under-
lying Kantian theses. They share the Kantian metaphysical division (though the 
Kantian terminology may not be employed) between noumena and phenomena, 
distinguishing between God in Himself or the Absolute in itself, and God or the 
Absolute as humanly experienced. And as we have seen, they share the Kantian 
epistemic notion that all experience, and so all religious experience, is structured 
by the (culturally and historically conditioned) world-view of the percipient. 
Thus, Religious Pluralism and Religious Relativism hold that differences of 
religious perception cannot just be treated as a matter of some people simply 
being wrong about the nature of the divine Reality, but rather that such differences 
of perception are inherent to religious perception and conception. Given these 
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points of fundamental agreement, which position, Pluralism or Relativism, better 
accounts for the conflicting truth-claims of the world religions? 
v 
An important exponent of Religious Pluralism is Wilfred Cantwell Smith. 
Cantwell Smith argues that the notions of "religion" and of "a religion" are 
obsolete. 25 He holds that only God and humanity are "givens"-global univer-
sals-and that the centrality given to religion is misguided and the conception 
of a religion as a belief system mistaken. Rather than starting from a particular 
religious tradition and then considering God and humanity, one should start from 
God and humanity and consider particular religious traditions from this global 
perspective. Smith reaches the Pluralist conclusion that the one truth about the 
religious life of humankind is conveyed in the various Buddhist, Christian, 
Islamic, -and so on, fonns.26 
Quite correctly, I think, Smith is attempting to circumvent the obstacles which 
religion often places between humans and their response to the divine. But there 
are several problems with his approach. First, he suggests replacing the world-
view(s) of particular religious traditions with another world-view on which it is 
presupposed that God and humanity are givens in the experience of all humans. 
This is neither a neutral world-view, nor one which will be shared by all religious 
persons. Many adherents of particular religious world-views would reject the 
generalized approach to the divine Cantwell Smith proposes as so amorphous 
that it fails to capture their religious beliefs. Second, Smith's position rests on 
the dubious thesis, which we have already addressed, that there is a universal, 
innate experience or conception of the divine. Smith himself effectively argues 
against Christian Exclusivism by asking: "how could one possibly know?" that 
only the Christian faith is correct. 27 But the same argument is equally applicable 
to Smith's own position: how could one possibly know that there is a global, 
innate apprehension or "givenness" of God and humanity? If anything, the evi-
dence most strongly supports the conclusion that all humankind does not share 
the same innate concept or primal experience of Ultimate Reality, much less of 
the nature of God, or even of humanity, per se. 
John Hick has developed another, rather impressive and comprehensive, 
Pluralist approach, in part by following out a key aspect of Cantwell Smith's 
work, viz. the rejection of the idea that a religion is fundamentally a set of 
beliefs. Proposing instead that religion definitively concerns "the transfonnation 
of human existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness,"28 Hick essen-
tially argues that the apparently conflicting truth-claims of the world's religions 
are, in the final analysis, irrelevant, and that the world religions can be reconciled, 
and the integrity of each preserved, through this more fundamental shared goal 
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of moving from self- to Reality-centeredness. 
Hick explicitly employs the two Kantian theses underlying both Pluralism and 
Relativism. He employs the Kantian thesis that all experience is structured by 
the mind by suggesting that specific forms of religious awareness "are formed 
by the presence of the divine Reality, ... coming to consciousness in terms of 
the different sets of religious concepts and structures of religious meaning that 
operate within the different religious traditions":29 i.e., as divine personae (e.g., 
Yahweh, Allah, etc.) for theists and as divine impersonae (e.g., Brahman, the 
Dharma, the Tao, etc.) for non-theists. 30 Regarding the phenomenal/noumenal 
distinction, he supports the distinction between personal and non-personal divine 
phenomena and the Eternal noumenon, on the basis of what he takes to be strong 
inductive evidence from religious experience. 3\ And indeed we do find consistent 
differentiation in the world religions between Ultimate Reality as we experience 
it and as it is in itself. There is the Hindu distinction between saguna Brahman 
and nirguna Brahman; the Jewish Cabalistic distinction between the God of the 
Bible and En Soph; and in the Christian tradition, Eckhart's distinction between 
God qua Trinity and the Godhead itself, and more recently, Tillich's notion of 
"the God above the God of theism," and so on. 
Hick does allow for the logical possibility that only one religion might be 
correct, but he thinks that the overwhelming facts of religious diversity make 
Religious Pluralism the most plausible response to the conflicting truth-claims 
of world religions. 32 A comprehensive Religious Pluralism like Hick's fully 
confronts the diversity of religious truth-claims. As such, it is an admirable and 
helpful response to the challenge which these conflicting claims presents. But 
even so, Religious Pluralism has significant shortcomings. 
VI 
Religious Pluralism fails to adequately account for the necessary, central role 
of cognition in religious faith. Hick suggests that differences of belief among 
the world religions are 
of great philosophical importance as elements within our respective 
theories about the universe; but they are not of great religious, i.e. 
soteriological, importance. For different groups can hold incompatible 
sets of theories all of which constitute intellectual frameworks within 
which the process of salvationlliberation can proceed. 33 
Of course, even incompatible theories can serve as guides to the same religious 
goal. But from this it neither follows that systems of belief and theory are 
irrelevant to guiding one to that goal, nor that it is unimportant which particular 
belief system one holds for reaching that end. Rather, the cognitive content of 
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religious faith is essential for providing a coherent and sufficiently comprehensive 
view of reality as a basis for purposive action and an effective, directive guide 
to "salvation/liberation." Further, the specific cognitive content of one's faith is 
of paramount importance since it is precisely what delimits one's specific path 
to salvation/liberation. And the specific path to salvation/liberation is not just a 
means to an end but is itself an integral part of the goal of salvation/liberation. 
This is expressed in the New Testament in the idea that the Kingdom of God is 
not future but begins in the lives of those who enter the new covenant now: 
"asked by the Pharisees when the kingdom was coming, he [Jesus] answered 
them, 'The kingdom of God is not coming with signs to be observed; ... the 
kingdom of God is in the midst of you.'" (Luke 17:20-21, RSV) Consequently, 
since the specific path to salvation/liberation is itself part of that very salvation/lib-
eration, a specific religious world-view is importantly constitutive of what makes 
a way of life a (particular) religious way of life. 
Indeed, it would seem that specific religious cognitive content is essential to 
making it meaningful even to be committed at all to a religious way of life. True, 
de-emphasizing specific doctrines-such as the idea that the Christ-event is the 
definitive self-revelation of the divine-makes it easier to reconcile apparently 
conflicting religious truth-claims, especially the notion of a personal God with the 
notion of a non-personal Absolute. But the more such specific doctrines are set 
aside, the more questionable it becomes whether a religious, as opposed to a non-
religious, commitment is what gives life ultimate significance. Insofar as the 
specificity of religious doctrines is de-emphasized, the basic religious meta-belief 
(I) that religion does indeed refer to a transcendent Reality which gives meaning to 
life becomes less plausible. The plausibility of (I) rests in large part on the evidence 
of religious experience. But as any hypothesis about the nature of reality is made 
more indefinite, the available inductive evidence to support that hypothesis is not 
increased, as for example Hick's defense of Religious Pluralism seems to sug-
gest, but decreased. For, evidence for an indefinite hypothesis is correspondingly 
indefinite or ambiguous. 
Another difficulty with Religious Pluralism is this. Exactly what a recognition 
of pluralism in general seems to acknowledge is that humans, and human concep-
tions, fundamentally differ. But then, to the extent that the differences of human 
conception embedded in the world religions are regarded as inconsequential, the 
dignity of the individual and the value of each distinct community of faith is 
lessened. 
To see how this applies to Christianity, consider Maurice Wiles' observation 
that, "there are two fundamental characteristics of the conception of God ... it 
must be a profoundly personal concept, . . . And secondly it is God in relation 
to us with which we have to do."34 The Christian understanding that the universe 
is under the providence of a God who has revealed Himself as a personal 
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being-One who understands and loves humanity-is and must be a conception 
of God as He manifests Himself to us. Yet this conception of an essentially 
personal God is not incidental but central to both corporate and individual 
Christian faith. Hick attempts to account for this by suggesting that among the 
world religions the Real is experienced as either personal or non-personal. 35 
While this Religious Pluralist view properly acknowledges that theistic under-
standing is an understanding of Ultimate Reality not an sich but as it confronts 
us in history, it obviates the significance of the Christian understanding of a 
personal God as somehow correctly revealing the nature of Ultimate Reality in 
itself. A personal reality might have non-personal aspects, but it could not be 
identical to something which is non-personal. Hence, this Pluralist account entails 
that the monotheist's experience of a personal divine reality cannot, to that 
extent, correctly represent the nature of the Real in itself. 
Finally, Religious Pluralism is deficient insofar as it unintentionally undermines 
the sense of the reality of God. It is part of the fundamental meta-belief (I) of 
religion that the God or the Absolute of which humans speak is real and not a 
metaphysical illusion or psychological delusion. But if the God of which 
monotheists speak is only an "image," only a perspective on an unknowable, 
noumenal reality, then the God of history will not be a real God. I will address 
this last point more fully below. 
These deficiencies must be met if a pluralistic resolution to the conflicting 
truth-claims of the world religions is to be successful. Yet despite these shortcom-
ings, Religious Pluralism has an obvious strength which must be retained for 
any successful pluralistic resolution. Religious Pluralism offers a reconciliation 
of the disparate world religious traditions which avoids the theologically unaccept-
able and epistemically unsupportable religious imperialism which we find in 
Exclusivism, and even in Inclusivism. 
VII 
If, then, we reject the religious imperialism of the Exclusivist and Inclusivist 
views that one's own tradition must be either the sole or at least the fullest arbiter 
of truth about the divine, we have two choices about how to deal with the 
irreducible plurality of religious conception and experience. We can either take 
the approach of Pluralism, treat the incompatible beliefs among differing religious 
world-views as ultimately inessential, and conclude that the great world religions 
simply offer different perspectives on Ultimate Reality. Or we can accept the 
doctrines which adherents of different world religions so ardently profess and 
passionately follow as essential to their faith. I have suggested that the former 
approach runs the danger of undermining the basic religious meta-belief (I), and 
reducing the substance of religious world-views to vacuity, obviating just those 
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differences in the path to salvation/liberation which give significance to each 
individual religious tradition. If I am right about this, we are led to conclude 
that different religions have different constitutive sets of truth-claims, and that-
while these sets of core truth-claims are mutually incompatible--each set of 
truth-claims is probably adequate in itself. 
This is the Religious Relativist response to the problem of religious pluralism. 36 
Granted, the different religious world-views among the world's great religious 
traditions are complementary insofar as they have a commonality in the religious 
experiences and perceptions of humankind. But different religious world-views 
are, ultimately, irreducibly plural, with features that are incompatible if not 
contradictory vis-a-vis other religious world-views. Further, corresponding to 
each distinct religious world-view, there is a different set of possible religious 
experiences. For what can be experienced depends on what can be real or unreal, 
and what can be real-i.e., what is possible-is determined by the percipient's 
world-view. 37 This means that each distinct religious world-view delineates a 
distinct possible divine reality38-though just to the extent that religious world-
views "overlap," characteristics of these distinct possible divine realities will 
overlap. 
For instance, monotheistic truth-claims will be most directly about God as 
humans experience Him, for they are most directly about divine reality relative 
to a particular theistic world-view. But then each theology, as a product of human 
constructive reasoning, will delimit only one possible divine reality. There will 
be other contrasting-though not totally mutually exclusive-valid theologies, 
held by other sincere women and men of faith, delimiting other possible divine 
phenomenal realities. 
Importantly, on this Religious Relativist account, "The" God of history, deli-
mited by the strictures of a particular theology is not, if He exists/9 somehow 
unreal vis-a-vis the noumenal. God qua noumenal lies "behind," so to speak, 
the possible plurality of real phenomenal divine realities, delimited by different 
monotheistic world-views. But noumenal and phenomenal reality are two dif-
ferent categories of reality. And just as there is nothing unreal about nuclear 
weapons or pains or piano concertos because they are part of phenomenal reality, 
"The" God of history, "The" God one confronts, is not less real, if He exists, 
just because He is not in the category of the noumenal. What could be more 
real than that which we do experience? And to try to transcend our experience 
for something putatively "untainted" by human thought is not only the worst 
sort of degenerate Platonism, it is to tum away from the means we do have in 
experience for understanding the divine and our own humanity in relation to the 
divine. 
Among the possible responses to the problem of religious pluralism, this 
Religious Relativist account of a possible plurality of phenomenal divine realities 
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seems to offer the best explanation of the differing experiences and incompatible 
conceptions of the great religious traditions. The Atheist response to the problem 
of religious pluralism is ruled out if we presuppose the religious meta-belief (I). 
Religious Exclusivism is neither tolerable nor any longer intellectually honest 
in the context of our contemporary knowledge of other faiths. Religious Subjec-
tivism is conceptually incoherent. Religious Inclusivism does not go far enough 
toward solving the problem of religious pluralism. And Religious Pluralism has 
serious deficiencies which Religious Relativism avoids. 
First, Religious Relativism reasserts the central role which cognition has in a 
religious life. The path to salvation is itself part of the salvific process. And 
one's religious world-view, as a guide for attitudes and actions, is inseparable 
from that path. Moreover, if all experience is conceptualized, then one will quite 
literally not be able to have any experience of the divine without a world-view 
which, e.g., enables one to experience the world as under the providence of 
God, or as an environment for working out one's Karma, etc. But then, as 
Religious Relativism asserts, specific truth-claims are essential to a religious 
tradition and way of life, and the conflict among the claims of the world religions 
cannot be resolved by de-emphasizing those conflicting claims. 
Second, it follows from this that Religious Relativism treats adherents of each 
religious tradition with fullest dignity. Regarding Christianity, we could say, as 
the Pluralist must, that the doctrine of the Incarnation cannot be taken literally 
and cannot mean for any Christian that Jesus uniquely manifests the presence 
of God.40 Or, we can allow that on some world-views this would be a perfectly 
rational view, delineating a world where Jesus is the definitive self-manifestation 
of God. Ironically, we fall back into a certain measure of the old absolutism 
that undergirds Exclusivism if we take the inflexible, even though Pluralist, first 
course. In contrast, Relativism not only allows with Pluralism that the world's 
great religions could have the same telos, it allows for the likelihood that more 
than one of the conflicting sets of ~pecific truth-claims, which adherents of the 
differing world religions themselves regard as vital to their faith, is correct. 
Third, that it is essential for the direct object of theological conception to be 
a real God seems to leave a Pluralist view like Hick's caught between two 
problematic options. As in his earlier work, the God of theology can be charac-
terized as an "image" of God. But then the God of theology does not have the 
ontological status of an existent entity with causal properties in the phenomenal 
world. This will unintentionally reduce the sense of the reality of God, for what 
theology would then be most directly referring to would not be God, but a human 
idea of the noumenal. So to speak about God, would be to speak about something 
noumenal about which we can only know that we do not know its true character. 
In contrast, on Religious Relativism the God of theology can be a real God, not 
just a conception of or perspective on the divine. God qua phenomenal is not 
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just, in Tillich's phrase, "a symbol for God." 
On the other hand, the Pluralist might hold, as Hick does in his more recent 
work ,41 that the divine phenomena just are the divine noumenon as experienced 
by humans via their particular religio-cultural perspectives. While this does 
indicate a more substantive ontological status for di vine personae and impersonae, 
it threatens to collapse the phenomenalnoumena distinction and runs counter to 
the basic idealist epistemology which underlies both Pluralism and Relativism. 
First, this suggests that the divine noumenon is itself experienced. One can 
postulate an unexperienced divine noumenon, and one can talk about divine 
phenomena which are (putatively) experienced. But this cannot amount to talk 
about the same thing-even if in different ways-for that would effectively be 
to eliminate the divine noumenon. And given an idealist epistemology, one 
cannot claim that the divine noumenon is experienced insofar as it appears to 
us in various ways, even though we cannot characterize the noumenal. For the 
conceptualization of all experience implies that what we experience can, in 
principle, be characterized. 
Second, that a particular divine phenomenon somehow manifests the divine 
noumenon is a matter of faith. And while it could be a matter of reasonable faith 
for an individual to claim that the divine phenomenon which they experience 
somehow manifests Ultimate Reality in itself, it would not make sense to say 
that it was a matter of one's faith that the various divine phenomena, which 
adherents of all the great world religions feel that they experience, all do manifest 
Ultimate Reality. Rather this would amount to a hypothesis or theory about the 
world religions. And I do not see how we could know that this hypothesis is 
true; how could we know that the divine phenomena of all the great world 
religions are (or most probably are) the divine noumenon as experienced by 
humans? One's faith warrants one's own religious commitment; it cannot warrant 
the mutually conflicting commitments of others. 
In contrast, on a Religious Relativist account, what is putatively experienced 
is not the noumenal Ultimate Reality, but e.g., the real God of history. Now, 
I do think that it is a mistake to suppose that one can know that specific claims 
which we make about phenomenal divine reality are also true of the divine 
noumenon, since this would obviate the very point of the noumenalphenomena 
distinction. But I think it is perfectly sensible to make the bare claim that there 
is a noumenal-whatever its character-which, so to speak, "lies behind" the 
phenomenal reality which we experience. Presumably there is no one-to-one 
correspondence between phenomena and noumena and hence no direct check 
from our successes and failures to the nature of the noumenal. But the greater 
the correspondence between our conception of the phenomenal and the character 
of the noumenal (whatever it is), the more our purposive activity, carried out 
within phenomenal reality as we understand it, will be successful and the closer-
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in principle-{)ur understanding of the phenomenal will correspond to the 
noumenal. 42 For the monotheist it is a matter of faith that, in this manner, one's 
own experience of the presence of "The" God of history does increase, on the 
whole, one's understanding of God in Himself. 
VIII 
One obvious point of resistance to this Religious Relativist account is the 
notion that there may be more than one phenomenal reality, and more than one 
phenomenal divine reality. But this notion initially seems strange only because 
we are used to thinking in terms of that one possible world which we regard as 
the (unique) actual world. Commonly, we treat any other conception of the actual 
world as simply false or mistaken. But if one accepts the idea that phenomenal 
reality is relative to a world-view, and that therefore there is a plurality of actual 
worlds corresponding to the plurality of distinct world-views, that does not 
undermine or alter what we call the actual world-i.e., the world delimited by 
our schemas. 
Recognizing that others might be responding to a different phenomenal God is 
like recognizing that others might rationally claim to discern a cyclical recurrence 
of events in history where you discern none. One can accept that there could be 
states of affairs which others but not you experience, without thereby committing 
yourself to the existence of any particular such state of affairs. 43 To have faith in 
only one real (phenomenal) God is to say that for oneself there is only one real God 
who lives and moves and has His being; for others there may be other real entities 
which are "The" God of their history. But just as any actual event or state of affairs 
is by definition an event or state of affairs in your actual world, any actual event 
which you acknowledge as an act of God is an act of the real God who confronts 
you within (your) history. 
IX 
Frank Whaling raises another possible objection to both Pluralism and 
Relativism. Whaling argues that these views avoid "the necessity of theological 
ordering of any sort," and that they have "the appearance of being a somewhat 
abstract exercise in the theology of religion, rather than a summing-up of where 
the Christian community around the world actually is."44 The second, descriptive 
point, that Christians do not currently tend to be Religious Pluralists or Relativists, 
misses the question of whether Christians ought to move toward Pluralism or 
Relativism in the face of the challenge of the conflicting truth-claims of the 
world religions. But with respect to the first point, it would be a serious defect 
of any pluralistic response to the world religions if diverse religious truth-claims 
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cannot be compared and assessed. Here Pluralism and Relativism offer two quite 
different approaches. 
Pluralists most naturally approach the apparently conflicting truth-claims of 
world religions from the perspective of a "global theology. "45 That is, the Pluralist 
fundamentally attempts to look at religious traditions from an external, or inclu-
sive point of view. 46 But the unavoidable historicity and the inherent enculturation 
of our thought obviate the very possibility of being able to assume this purported 
global perspective. There can be no such thing as a "neutral" or "objective" 
perspective in either religious or non-religious matters. Hence, any attempt to 
assess other faiths from a genuinely global perspective is inherently impossible. 
Religious Relativism, on the other hand, avoids this difficulty by suggesting 
an internal approach to assessing other faiths. Relativism, more fundamentally 
than Pluralism, recognizes the inextricably socio-historical conditioning of one's 
perspective, and hence fundamentally recognizes that judgments about other 
faiths will necessarily be made from the point of view of one's own faith. This 
is simply to acknowledge an inherent condition of the human mind, and does 
not entail falling back into the religious imperialism we found in Exclusivism 
and Inclusivism. For there are general meta-criteria that can be applied across 
world-views to assess the acceptability of a world-view. These criteria include 
the internal coherence of a world-view, its comprehensiveness, thoroughness of 
explanation (e.g., that it does not depend on ad hoc hypotheses), the efficacious-
ness of the world-view in producing its intended end, considerations of parsimony, 
and so on. Thus Relativism, while not attempting to assume the stance of an 
impossible "neutral" global theology, can employ these meta-criteria to assess 
other faiths and so meet Whaling's objection. Further, this gives Relativism a 
strength that we observed in Religious Inclusivism. Religious Relativism, while 
recognizing that salvation could come to others in other traditions, supports the 
strength of commitment to one's own tradition. 
x 
While the Pluralist attempts to solve the problem of religious pluralism by 
setting aside conflicting truth-claims and emphasizing a universality and unity 
to all religions, the Religious Relativist can resolve the problem of religious 
pluralism by accepting these conflicting truth-claims as an appropriate manifes-
tation of divine/human interaction. In the spirit of the Leibnizian notion that not 
just the quantity of good, but the variety of good things makes this "the best of 
all possible worlds"-the world that a good God would create--we should expect 
correct religious beliefs and veridical religious experiences to be as richly varied 
as human needs and human individuality. Contrary to the Pluralist conception, 
an ultimate uniformity of the central elements of all religious traditions is not 
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an ultimate value. Where Pluralism tends to homogenize religion, if one believes 
that God indeed has providence over the world, then precisely what the evidence 
of the world we find ourselves in indicates is that a diversity of religious truth-
claims is intrinsically valuable, and divinely valued. Rather than a problem to 
be solved, the conflicting truth-claims of the great religious traditions, and even 
conflicting systems within traditions, can be accepted as a profound indication 
of God's manifest love and delight in the diverse worlds of His creatures. 
That our religious beliefs have a correlation to the transcendent divine reality 
is a matter of faith. Since our perception and understanding are ineluctably 
limited to our world-view, even if what we believe is true about God qua 
phenomenal turns out to be true also of God qua noumenal, we could never 
know that that was so. We cannot know that we possess the requisite conceptual 
resources to apply to God in Himself, or know that we have formed ideas which 
are true of God qua noumenal, or know that our ideas do properly refer to the 
noumenal God. But just because we cannot know these things to be true vis-a-vis 
the noumenal God, this clearly does not entail that they are not the case. I do 
not see how it could be shown that it is impossible that our concepts or beliefs 
do in fact correctly refer to the noumenal. Quite the contrary, it is a matter of 
reasonable faith that Christian religious experience and theological conception 
do provide the basis for proper reference and proper talk about God in Himself. 
Yet to acknowledge that we cannot transcend our world-views, and that they in 
turn are inescapably structured by our limiting socio-historical perspective, is to 
recognize the fundamental fallibility and finitude of even our noblest conceptions 
and highest values. There is thus a religiously appropriate humbleness which 
Religious Relativism brings to our claims to religious truth. 
Faced with the inescapable challenge of the claims of other faiths, it may now 
be time for Christians to move toward a Christian Relativism. A Christian 
Relativism would combine the strengths of Exclusivism and Inclusivism, and of 
Pluralism, without their respective disadvantages. A Christian Relativism would 
enable us to say, on the one hand, that salvation through Christ is definitive, 
without committing us, on the other hand, to the unsupportable view that salvation 
is exclusively Christian. A Christian Relativism would sustain Christian commit-
ment and support Christian claims to truth, without claiming to be the only truth. 47 
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